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63-3686/a

17 MAY 1968

The Honorable W. Averell Harriman  
Under Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

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*can*  
*for Political Affairs*

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Dear Averell:



State Dept. review completed

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The statement of US policy objectives in relation to Bloc civil air activities in the Free World reflects a realistic awareness of our capabilities in this field by acknowledging that total preclusion of further Bloc expansion is impossible. Establishment of priorities for the granting of civil aviation assistance should focus on countries providing vital gateways for air routes. This should enable US policy to function with a high degree of flexibility, yet with an effective concentration of resources. At present this is particularly relevant, for example, with respect to such countries as Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, whose consent to Bloc overflight is essential to Bloc development of an East-West African air service south of the Sahara. In this context, US encouragement of regional African air carriers should be particularly helpful in retarding further Bloc air expansion on the African continent.

(Signed) JOHN A. McCOMB

John A. McCombe  
Director

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UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1963

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not automatically declassified.

Dear John:

I send for your consideration and comment the enclosed statements about our civil aviation policy toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The statements consist of a background memorandum and two attachments relating to civil air transport relations between the United States and the Bloc and to our policy toward Bloc civil aviation activities in the Free World. The enclosed statements were approved by the Secretary.

I have asked the interested offices in the Department of State to initiate program planning, consistent with the objectives set forth on the enclosed statements, to anticipate and to meet Bloc civil air activities, particularly in Africa and in Latin America. In view of this concurrent activity, I should appreciate receiving your comments on the enclosed statements at an early date, preferably no later than May 15, 1963.

Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake is coordinating for me this aspect of our civil air policy. In order to reduce formalities to a minimum I suggest that if any questions on the enclosed policy

statements

The Honorable  
John A. McCone,  
Director of Central Intelligence.

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statements should arise you or your staff people communicate directly with Ambassador Timberlake. I am always available, of course, to discuss these matters directly with you.

I am sending similar letters to other interested agencies: the Departments of Defense and of Commerce, Federal Aviation Agency, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Bureau of the Budget.

Sincerely yours,

  
W. Averell Harriman

Enclosure.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

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April 19, 1963

MEMORANDUM ON CIVIL AVIATION POLICY TOWARD  
SINO-SOVIET BLOC

It is necessary to bring up-to-date our policy statement on bilateral civil aviation relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc in view of developments since the previous policy statement adopted in 1957 by the National Security Council was withdrawn last year. While we assume that in the foreseeable future there is unlikely to be an improvement in our relations with the Bloc of sufficient importance to warrant consideration of a bilateral civil aviation agreement, we should be ready for such a contingency. The attached policy statement (Tab A) provides for that contingency and incorporates considerations militating for and against an agreement on our side and on the Bloc side.

The second draft policy statement (Tab B) has been developed because NSC 5726/1 has been withdrawn and we need comprehensive policy guidance in the area of Bloc civil air activities abroad. Our experience with the Congo, the Sudan, and Cuba suggests strongly to me that we need a basic policy statement against which to measure and develop programs of action, particularly in Africa and Latin America, related to Bloc civil air activities in the Free World.

It is felt that such a policy must rest on the following premises and rationale:

(1) That Bloc inroads in the civil aviation area are undesirable because they can enhance, sometimes in substantial measure, the Bloc's capabilities to attain its military and political objectives in the developing countries, and

(2) For both political and economic reasons, our capabilities to prevent such inroads are limited and therefore must be applied with circumspection on the basis of a carefully defined system of priorities.

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While the dangers from Bloc moves in this field can be indiscriminately exaggerated, our experience amply demonstrates that they can afford opportunities for Bloc political gains beyond those provided by other forms of Bloc presence. In a crisis situation such as occurred in the Congo and in Cuba, the lack of air traffic rights handicapped the Bloc in supporting footholds it had gained through other means. Equally serious is the possibility that Bloc influence in, and control over, air facilities within a country could enable it to act quickly and decisively at a time of internal political crisis.

Beyond these critical potentialities, civil air access to the LDC's tends to enhance the Bloc's prestige and to facilitate its over-all program to develop close political and economic bonds with specific developing countries. Bloc experience in Guinea and Ghana, however, indicates that civil aviation activities can boomerang. When the Bloc undertakes to support a civil aviation program that is uneconomic to begin with, it runs the risk of being saddled with the costs and the onus of responsibility when the program fails and disillusionment sets in. More generally, in any attempt to establish a broad international civil aviation network in competition with the West, the Bloc operates under the considerable disabilities of its relatively inferior equipment and of prospectively thin traffic routes.

In regard to our own limitations, we must recognize first that among the non-aligned developing countries the negotiation of an exchange of air rights with the Bloc frequently is viewed as an assertion of their recently won sovereignty and as evidence of balanced neutrality. Additionally, an offer of Bloc civil aviation assistance can appeal to a strongly felt need irrespective of its justification for improved transport facilities within and through these countries. We could attempt to counter such offers whenever they are made but such an across-the-board effort would be politically burdensome and would create serious distortions in our economic assistance programs.

These circumstances point to the need for flexible and carefully modulated measures in this field. Our civil

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aviation program in developing countries will be most successful in limiting Bloc penetration to the degree that they are consistent with over-all economic assistance criteria. We cannot, however, limit our actions in this field solely to measures justified by these criteria. Our approach should be based on the following principles:

1. We should use diplomatic means to discourage other Governments from entering into civil aviation agreements with the Bloc, stressing the dangers involved and our unfavorable view of such actions. At the same time, we should make sure that the developing countries have a clear understanding of where their self-interest in fact lies and an accurate measure of their bargaining strength in any negotiation with the Bloc.
2. Through our own programs and through actions developed jointly with our allies, we should seek to encourage the development of national air services that meet the transportation development needs of the country concerned and fit into feasible regional services. Such programs would tend to fill vacuums that Bloc civil aviation offers seek to exploit and thus would provide the developing countries with effective self-interest grounds for rejecting civil aviation ties with the Bloc.
3. We should limit our preemptive efforts to those countries where such programs would be politically feasible and strategically dictated.

Concurrent with the process of obtaining the concurrences of the other interested agencies, work will be started to formulate action programs designed to achieve our objectives in anticipating and in contravening Sino-Soviet Bloc civil air activities.

BLATT - 11/20/62

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES CIVIL AVIATION OBJECTIVES AS  
RELATED TO SINO-SOVIET BLOC CIVIL AVIATION ACTIVITIES IN  
THE FREE WORLD

I. Objectives

A. To prevent by such means as are practicable the use of Sino-Soviet Bloc civil aviation for political or military ends.

B. To discourage Sino-Soviet Bloc civil air penetration either through the operation of Bloc air transport services or through the provision of Bloc aid to national aviation enterprises in the form of sales or gifts of air-craft and equipment, training or management assistance. In this connection to give priority to those countries areas to which would most enhance Sino-Soviet aggressive military or political action either because of the sensitivity of the country concerned or because it provides a gateway to sensitive areas. United States efforts to this end insofar as is possible, to be consistent with the broad objectives of over-all United States air transport policy.

C. To discourage, where politically feasible, through air service by Free World Carriers between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the less-developed areas.

Guidance

A. The Soviet Union and bloc countries have been able to establish civil aviation footholds in Africa and Asia, but not yet except for Cuba, in Latin America. It is probable that nationalist or neutralist sentiments, considerations of prestige, or aspirations of gain will cause certain less-developed countries to look with favor on Sino-Soviet proposals for the establishment of civil aviation relationships. The United States Government should be alert to developments in this field and should, through regular guidance and through the assignment of qualified civil aviation reporting officers to key Missions abroad, assure an adequate flow of intelligence.

B. As a practical matter, it may be impossible totally to preclude further extension of Sino-Soviet Bloc civil aviation services to the less-developed countries of the Free World. In any event, the cost to the United States would probably be prohibitive. The United States Government should, therefore, as a matter of urgency, establish priorities as among Free World target countries. Since Sino-Soviet Bloc air services have not been extended to the free countries of Latin America, the general guidance should be to seek to preclude any entrance, within this broad prescription, however, it will be desirable to determine those gateways which would add most significantly to Sino-Soviet capabilities either for additional expansion of air services or for exploiting political weaknesses in the area.

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In Africa, where the Soviet air presence is already partially established, but where the Soviet civil aviation image has been somewhat tarnished, we should systematically review priorities to the end of inhibiting Soviet air advance into those gateways or countries where Soviet civil aviation would be potentially most dangerous to free world interests. In the Far East and Near East, political and economic considerations will probably hold the Sino-Soviet Bloc where they are for the time being; nevertheless, the situation should be reviewed to the end of assessing possible changes in attitudes toward admitting Sino-Soviet Bloc air services.

C. A careful assessment needs to be made of our own means and capabilities for limiting and preventing the advance of Sino-Soviet civil aviation in the free world. We should not consider ourselves limited to a civil aviation response; there may be occasions and opportunities for the use of other means or techniques to check the extension of Sino-Soviet civil aviation. Within the area of civil air transport itself, there is need to assess the availability or relevance to particular situations of the following assets and techniques and to apply them promptly:

1. The provision of technical assistance for the civil aviation from (a) the United States, (b) other free world countries, and (c) the ICAO and other international organizations.

2. Financial assistance, from the United States or other free world sources, for civil air facilities including aircraft and operations.

3. Assistance, through financial means or by participation of United States or other Free World air enterprises, in the development and expansion of regional air services, the existence of which would tend to work against a favorable attitude toward civil aviation agreements with Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.

4. Assistance to, or participation by United States and other Free World air enterprises in, national aviation activities. Assistance may also be rendered to aviation activities other than air transport.

D. In a crisis situation, it may be possible to hamper Sino-Soviet Bloc air access to a particular area through diplomatic representations. As countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc (except Poland and Czechoslovakia) are not parties to the Chicago Convention, they do not enjoy automatic overflight rights and, hence, must secure approval from countries to be overflown. Adherents to the Chicago Convention may require overflying aircraft of Bloc nations which are parties to the Convention (Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Poland)

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to land in these territories for inspection. The Convention prohibits the carriage of munitions or implements of war over the territory of adhering states unless advance permission has been obtained. Most Free World countries have accepted the obligations of the Chicago Convention and it should be our policy to assure that the appropriate provisions are widely known and enforced.

E. In seeking to achieve the objectives set forth in this policy statement, it will be necessary to keep in view our larger international aviation goal of maintaining and building an efficient and economically viable international air transport system. It should be recognized that a policy of inhibiting the extension of Sino-Soviet Bloc civil aviation may involve actions inconsistent with this goal. When this is the case, the departure from basic international air policy should be recognized and the potential benefits or gains to our security interests assessed accordingly.

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POLICY STATEMENT ON BILATERAL CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT  
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SINO-  
SOVIET BLOC

OBJECTIVES

1. To prevent or inhibit the use by the Soviet Bloc of civil aviation as an instrument to penetrate and subvert the nations of the free world.
2. To persuade other countries, particularly in Latin America and other underdeveloped countries, not to permit Soviet Bloc countries to provide air services to those countries and not to permit Soviet Bloc countries to provide equipment and technical assistance to national air enterprises.
3. To bear in mind the close relationship between our civil aviation policy toward the Soviet Bloc and our ability to influence the policies of other free world countries in this field toward the Bloc.
4. Nevertheless, recognizing that a major improvement in relations between the US and the USSR would revive interest in the establishment of a civil air transport agreement between us, to remain flexible enough to take advantage of a serious change in attitude on the part of one Soviet Bloc country, particularly a satellite, towards the United States so as to consider such direct air services, under suitable safeguards, at that time.
5. Anticipating such eventuality, to minimize the points of conflict in policy which would result from a future change of climate encouraging the establishment of civil air relations between the US and a Soviet Bloc country.

MAJOR POLICY GUIDANCE

Consideration Affecting the Timing of a Civil Air Agreement Between US and the USSR:

6. Soviet Bloc civil air penetration of developing countries is undesirable as it can enhance the Bloc's capability to attain its military and political

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objectives. In a crisis situation, air traffic rights can be used to support footholds which the Bloc powers have gained through other means. Equally serious is the possibility that Bloc influence in, and control over, air facilities within a country could enable it to act quickly and decisively at a time of internal political crisis. The US has therefore consistently followed a policy of seeking to dissuade countries which may be opened to serious communist penetration from entering into air services agreement with the Soviet Bloc countries or accepting their aviation assistance.

7. The task of persuading other countries, particularly in Latin America, not to permit Soviet Bloc air services to their countries and not to accept Soviet Bloc civil aviation aid would be made difficult, if not impossible, by the implementation of direct air services between the US and the USSR. Our policy toward them should accordingly de-emphasize our own refusal to sign such agreements with the Soviet Bloc and rely more on the argument that the underdeveloped countries would (further) open their countries to Soviet penetration and subversion by entering into such agreements.

8. The entry of a US carrier into the USSR is of little economic value to the US and involves no significant element of national prestige. We should not enter into an air services agreement with the Soviets as long as the advantages to us are outweighed by the disadvantages, and especially while we can hope by such a policy to prevent or inhibit the penetration of developing countries by the Soviets through air services agreements.

9. Soviet entry into the US is, on the other hand, a matter of great political importance to them and is a substantial concession which the US can

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make at an appropriate time. To retain flexibility and to minimize the points of policy conflict which would result from a future change in the relations of the US and the Soviets and would encourage the establishment of civil air services between the two countries, actions taken in the interim to inhibit Soviet Bloc civil air penetration of other countries should be so designed as to minimize the inconsistencies in policy which might otherwise result in the event of the establishment of future civil air services between the US and the USSR. For this reason, the US should be prepared to consult with other countries, especially the countries of Latin America, before entering into negotiations with the Soviets.

U.S. - USSR Air Transport Relations:

10. An Air Transport Services Agreement between the US and the USSR was initialled on August 23, 1961. It was not signed at that time because of the unsatisfactory relations between the two countries caused by Soviet belligerence in connection with Berlin. From the technical, security and commercial viewpoints that agreement was adequate at that time and probably could serve as a basis for agreement in the future.

11. Any agreement must include:

- a. Adequate security safeguards.
- b. Reciprocity of rights exchanged.
- c. Careful definition of the conditions under which the rights are to be exercised.

12. Because of the potential disadvantages for the United States involved in bilateral US-USSR air services, the institution of such services should be considered only following a major improvement in general relations between the two countries.

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Air Transport Relations with Other Soviet Bloc Countries:

13. As long as the United States has a policy of non-recognition of the regimes in the Soviet Zone of Germany, mainland China, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam, this Government should not permit American air carriers to establish services to those countries and should not permit their airlines to serve territory under United States control.

14. Czechoslovakia is an adherent to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and to the International Air Services Transit Agreement. A bilateral Air Transport Agreement still exists between the United States and Czechoslovakia. Although Czechoslovakia is entitled to certain rather extensive rights under those agreements, the United States should not allow Czechoslovakia to exercise them unless there is a major improvement in relations between the two countries. In that case the existing bilateral agreement should be renegotiated to meet the requirements of 13 above. Barring such a major improvement in relations, the existing bilateral agreement should be terminated if that is the only way to prevent utilization by Czechoslovakia of its rights under that agreement.

15. Similarly the United States should seek to prevent Czechoslovakia from using its rights under any of the agreements listed in 14 above to transit the United States or territory or air bases under United States control to gain access to Latin America or other underdeveloped areas. Actions taken in this direction must be carefully devised in order not to compromise the broad benefits which the United States and other Free World countries derive from the International Air Services Transit Agreement.

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16. Poland is also an adherent to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the International Air Services Transit Agreement. Any attempt by Poland to exercise such rights in or over United States-controlled territory or air bases must be considered in the framework of over-all United States policy toward Poland. Poland should not be allowed to use such rights to gain access to Latin America or other underdeveloped areas. The precautionary consideration set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 15 above applies here also.

17. If Bulgaria, Hungary, or Rumania seek air transport relations with the United States, similar criteria should be applied as in the case of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

18. If the USSR, or another Bloc country, subsequently adheres to the Convention on International Civil Aviation or the International Air Services Transit Agreement, the United States civil aviation policy toward that country should be immediately re-evaluated.

19. Any action proposed on the subject covered by this paper should be cross-checked with the Statement of United States Civil Aviation Objectives as related to Soviet Bloc Civil Aviation Activities in the Free World .

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ATTACHMENT

General Considerations

Introduction:

1. At the end of World War II, the United States had the material and manpower to mount an ambitious international civil aviation system throughout the world. It did so with great success. It also was the leader in establishing the International Civil Aviation and the International Air Services Transit Agreement which facilitated the development of civil aviation.
2. At that time the USSR had relatively little capability in the international civil aviation field and was occupied with establishing its own domestic civil aviation network. Soviet air transport aircraft were largely American-made, or copies of American-made aircraft. Gradually through the postwar years the USSR established a domestic network suitable to its own requirements and developed turboprop and pure jet transport aircraft of its own design. The general standards of Soviet civil aviation are still many years behind those of the United States. This is true both in the technical and customer service areas.
3. The standards set by United States airlines, the Federal Aviation Agency and the Civil Aeronautics Board have been copied in many countries of the world. Many of the American companies have played a role in assisting foreign airlines to establish themselves. Similarly many employees of the Federal Aviation Agency have done technical assistance work either in Civil Aviation Assistance Groups under AID programs or as ICAO technical assistance advisors.

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Factors Affecting US Policy

4. Advantages to the United States of Air Service to the Soviet Bloc

A number of advantages could accrue to the United States if an American airline were able to operate into or across the USSR and its satellites in Eastern Europe.

- a. Opportunities, presently scant, would be increased for the collection of intelligence through observations by ground crews stationed in the Soviet bloc and by air crews.
- b. The United States would gain propaganda advantages from the presence of its modern aircraft in bloc countries and from the superiority of its air transport techniques and services over those of the bloc countries.
- c. In the unlikely event that complete overflight rights could be obtained, the United States would benefit from the considerably shorter routes on certain East-West flights.
- d. Reciprocal air services would facilitate expansion of East-West contracts.
- e. American air services would facilitate communications, particularly unclassified diplomatic pouches, with our missions in the Soviet bloc.
- f. The propaganda picture carefully built by the Communists of the use by the United States of aviation for mainly military purposes would be somewhat blurred by the presence of the obviously peacefully configured luxurious American jet transports.

5. Advantages to the USSR of Air Services to the US:

An air services agreement with the US would:

- a. Assist the Soviet bloc's promotion of an aura of respectability and facilitate the Soviet aim of dispelling the concept of an iron curtain.

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- c. Improve communications with the Soviet and Bloc missions in the US.
- d. Save foreign exchange by carrying Soviet official delegations and tourists to the US and earn foreign exchange by carrying foreign passengers.
- e. Facilitate the controlled travel of Soviet citizens.

6. Additional advantages to USSR:

a. An agreement with the US would immediately put the USSR in a much better position to obtain similar rights in other countries, especially in Latin America and in African countries where landing and overflight rights would be necessary to conduct a Latin American service.

b. Connecting flights out of the United States would facilitate Soviet capability, already ample, of Soviet clandestine services to conduct espionage, sabotage, and subversion in other free-world countries.

7. Reciprocity

Full reciprocity must be insisted upon in air transport relations with Soviet Bloc countries.

8. Operational Problems -

The occasional special flights of Soviet aircraft into the United States have demonstrated that there are operational problems growing out of incompatibility of equipment and air traffic control systems, crew discipline and training, and airworthiness and operational standards. Solutions to these problems must be provided for if reciprocal air services are established.

9. Subsidy

Pan American World Airways is the only American carrier certificated to service the Soviet Union. Even if this particular route were operated at a loss, such loss would not of itself--under the US Supreme Court decision of February 1, 1954--establish a basis for subsidy under the Federal Aviation Act. Pan American

has been

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and the Civil Aeronautics Board would want to constitute the route in such a way that the matter of subsidy

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would not be likely to arise.

10. Internal Security

The operations of Soviet bloc airlines within the United States have obvious security implications and may well impose an increased burden on departments and agencies responsible for implementation of the US internal security program, particularly those aspects having to do with espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons. While aircraft would be effective vehicles for the introduction of fissionable material or for surprise nuclear attack, it seems unlikely that, given our deterrent striking power, the Soviets would risk a sneak attack with one or two aircraft. This security factor was covered by the report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) concerning Internal Security Safeguards Applicable to the Entry into the United States of Soviet Bloc Aircraft Engaged in Scheduled Air Service, March 23, 1961.

CHTimberlake:pp 1/29/63

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DATE: 6 May 1963

TO: DAD/RR

FROM:

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SUBJECT: Soviet Civil Aid

REMARKS:

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reply and route it to A/DCI via  
myself.

Pls return this buckslip  
with your reply  
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6 MAY 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick

At [ ] suggestion, [ ]  
and [ ] reviewed this response for DD/P  
interests. [ ] passed their comments  
to Larry Houston who gave us their suggestions as  
well as his own and signed off on the draft letter.

[ ]  
Deputy Assistant Director  
Research and Reports


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